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Abstract
There is a rising interest in studying the robust-
ness of deep neural network classifiers against
adversaries, with both advanced attack and de-
fence techniques being actively developed. How-
ever, most recent work focuses on discriminative
classifiers, which only model the conditional dis-
tribution of the labels given the inputs. In this
paper, we propose and investigate the deep Bayes
classifier, which improves classical naive Bayes
with conditional deep generative models. We fur-
ther develop detection methods for adversarial
examples, which reject inputs with low likelihood
under the generative model. Experimental re-
sults suggest that deep Bayes classifiers are more
robust than deep discriminative classifiers, and
that the proposed detection methods are effective
against many recently proposed attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow
et al., 2015). The latest attack techniques can easily fool a
deep net with imperceptible perturbations (Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Papernot et al., 2016b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Ku-
rakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018),
even in the black-box case, where the attacker does not have
access to the network’s weights (Papernot et al., 2017b;
Chen et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018;
Alzantot et al., 2018a; Uesato et al., 2018). Adversarial
attacks are serious security threats to machine learning sys-
tems, threatening applications beyond image classification
(Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018b).
To address this outstanding security issue, researchers have
proposed defence mechanisms against adversarial attacks.
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Adversarial training, which augments the training data with
adversarially perturbed inputs, has shown moderate success
at defending against recently proposed attack techniques
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Trame`r et al.,
2018; Madry et al., 2018). In addition, recent advances in
Bayesian neural networks have demonstrated that uncer-
tainty estimates can be used to detect adversarial attacks
(Li & Gal, 2017; Feinman et al., 2017; Louizos & Welling,
2017; Smith & Gal, 2018). Another notable category of
defence techniques involves the usage of generative models.
For example, Gu & Rigazio (2014) used an auto-encoder
to denoise the inputs before feeding them to the classifier.
This denoising approach has been extensively investigated,
and the “denoisers” in usage include generative adversarial
networks (Samangouei et al., 2018), PixelCNNs (Song et al.,
2018) and denoising auto-encoders (Kurakin et al., 2018).
These developments rely on the “off-manifold” conjecture –
adversarial examples are far away from the data manifold,
although Gilmer et al. (2018) has challenged this idea with
a synthetic “sphere classification” example.
Surprisingly, much less recent work has investigated the
robustness of generative classifiers (Ng & Jordan, 2002)
against adversarial attacks, where such classifiers explicitly
model the conditional distribution of the inputs given la-
bels. Typically, a generative classifier produces predictions
by comparing between the likelihood of the labels for a
given input, which is closely related to the “distance” of the
input to the data manifold associated with a class. There-
fore, generative classifiers should be robust to many recently
proposed adversarial attacks if the “off-manifold” conjec-
ture holds for many real-world applications. Unfortunately,
many generative classifiers in popular use, including naive
Bayes and linear discriminant analysis (Fisher, 1936), per-
form poorly on natural image classification tasks, making
it difficult to verify the “off-manifold” conjecture and the
robustness of generative classifiers with these tools.
Are generative classifiers more robust to recently proposed
adversarial attack techniques? To answer this, we improve
the naive Bayes algorithm by using deep generative mod-
els, and evaluate the conjecture on the proposed generative
classifier. In summary, our contributions include:
• We propose deep Bayes which models the (conditional)
distribution of an input by a deep latent variable model
(LVM). We learn the LVM with the variational auto-
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encoder algorithm (Kingma & Welling, 2014; Rezende
et al., 2014), and for classification we approximate
Bayes’ rule using importance sampling.
• We propose three detection methods for adversarial
attacks. The first two use the learned generative model
as a proxy of the data manifold, and reject inputs that
are far away from it. The third computes statistics for
the classifier’s output probability vector, and rejects
inputs that lead to under-confident predictions.
• We evaluate the robustness of the proposed genera-
tive classifier on MNIST and a binary classification
dataset derived from CIFAR-10. We further show the
advantage of generative classifiers over a number of
discriminative classifiers, including Bayesian neural
networks and discriminative LVMs.
• We improve the robustness of deep neural networks
on CIFAR-10 multi-class classification, by fusing dis-
criminatively learned visual features with the proposed
generative classifiers. On defending a number of popu-
lar `∞ attacks, the fusion model outperforms a baseline
discriminative VGG16 network (Simonyan & Zisser-
man, 2014) by a large margin.
2. Deep Bayes: conditional deep LVM as a
generative classifier
Denote pD(x,y) the data distribution for the input x ∈
RD and label y ∈ {yc|c = 1, ..., C}, where yc is
the one-hot encoding vector for class c. For a given
x ∈ RD we can define the ground-truth label by y ∼
pD(y|x) if x ∈ supp(pD(x)). We assume the data dis-
tribution pD(x,y) follows the manifold assumption: for
every class c, the conditional distribution pD(x|yc) has its
support as a low-dimensional manifold. Thus the train-
ing data D = {(x(n),y(n))}Nn=1 is generated as follows:
y(n) ∼ pD(y),x(n) ∼ pD(x|y).
A generative classifier first builds a generative model
p(x,y) = p(x|y)p(y), and then, in prediction time, pre-
dicts the label y∗ of a test input x∗ using Bayes’ rule,
p(y∗|x∗) = p(x
∗|y∗)p(y∗)
p(x∗)
= softmaxCc=1 [log p(x
∗,yc)] ,
where softmaxCc=1 denotes the softmax operator over the c
axis. Here the output probability vector is computed analo-
gously to many discriminative classifiers which use softmax
activation in the output layer, so many existing attacks can
be tested directly. However, unlike discriminative classi-
fiers, the “logit” values prior to softmax activation have
a clear meaning here, which is the log joint distribution
log p(x∗,yc) of input x∗ and a given label yc. Therefore,
one can also analyse the logit values to determine whether
the unseen pair (x∗,y∗) is legitimate, a utility which will
be discussed further in section 3.
Figure 1. A visualisation of the graphical models, including both
Generative (top row) and Discriminative ones (bottom row), as
well as Fully connected and Bottleneck ones. The last character
indicates the first node in the topological order of the graph. The
graphs are colored in a consistent way as in the result figures.
Naive Bayes is perhaps the most well-known generative
classifier; it assumes a factorised distribution for the con-
ditional generator, i.e. p(x|y) = ∏Dd=1 p(xd|y), which is
inappropriate for e.g. image and speech data. Fortunately,
we can leverage the recent advances in generative modelling
and apply a deep generative model for the joint distribution
p(x,y). More specifically, we use a deep latent variable
model (LVM) p(x, z,y) to construct a generative classi-
fier. Importantly, this leads to a conditional distribution
p(x|y) =
∫
p(x,z,y)dz∫
p(x,z,y)dzdx
that is not factorised (even when
p(x|z,y) is), which is much more powerful than naive
Bayes. We refer to such generative classifiers that use deep
generative models as deep Bayes classifiers.
Depending on the definition of the model p(x, z,y), the
resulting classifier can be either generative or discrimina-
tive. Thus we evaluate the effect of different factorisation
structures on the robustness of the induced classifier from
the joint distribution p(x, z,y) (see Figure 1).
p(x, z,y) = p(z)p(y|z)p(x|z,y) (GFZ)
p(x, z,y) = pD(y)p(z|y)p(x|z,y) (GFY)
p(x, z,y) = p(z)p(y|z)p(x|z) (GBZ)
p(x, z,y) = pD(y)p(z|y)p(x|z) (GBY)
p(x, z,y) = pD(x)p(z|x)p(y|z,x) (DFX)
p(x, z,y) = p(z)p(x|z)p(y|z,x) (DFZ)
p(x, z,y) = pD(x)p(z|x)p(y|z) (DBX)
We use the initial character “G” to denote generative classi-
fiers and “D” to denote discriminative classifiers. Models
with the second character as “F” have a fully connected
graph, while “B” models have bottleneck structures. The
last character of the model name indicates the first node
in topological order. We do not test other architectures un-
der this nomenclature, as either the graph contains directed
cycles (e.g. x → y → z → x), or z is the last node in
topological order (e.g. x → y, (x,y) → z) so that the
marginalisation of z does not affect classification.
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Within the generative classifiers in our design, different
graphical models impose different assumptions on the data
generation process. E.g. GFZ and GBZ assume there is a
confounder z that affects both x and y, while GFY and
GBY assume the distribution over z is class-dependent. The
bottleneck models GBZ, GBY and DBX, when compared
with their fully-connected counterparts, enforces the usage
of the latent code z for representation learning.
For training, we follow Kingma & Welling (2014) and
Rezende et al. (2014) to introduce an amortised approximate
posterior q(z|x,y), and train both p and q by maximising
the variational lower-bound:
ED[LVI(x,y)] = 1
N
N∑
n=1
Eq
[
log
p(xn, zn,yn)
q(zn|xn,yn)
]
. (1)
After training, the predicted class probability vector y∗ for a
future input x∗ is computed by an approximation to Bayes’
rule with importance sampling zkc ∼ q(z|x∗,yc):
p(y∗|x∗) ≈ softmaxCc=1
[
log
1
K
K∑
k=1
p(x∗, zkc ,yc)
q(zkc |x∗,yc)
]
. (2)
Therefore, for generative classifiers the probability of x un-
der the generative model affects the predictions. By contrast,
DFX and DBX do not know if x is close to the data manifold
or not, as the pD(x) term in these models is cancelled out in
eq. (2). Model DFZ is somewhat intermediate, as it builds
a generative model for the inputs x (thus p(x, z) is used
in eq. (2)) but also directly parameterises the conditional
distribution p(y|x, z).
3. Detecting adversarial attacks with
generative classifiers
We propose detection methods for adversarial examples
using the generative classifier’s logit values. As an illustrat-
ing example, consider a labelled dataset of “cat” and “dog”
images. If an adversarial image of a cat xadv is incorrectly la-
belled as “dog”, then either this image is ambiguous, or, un-
der a perfect generative model, the logit log p(xadv, “dog”)
will be significantly lower than normal. This means we can
detect attacks using the logits log p(x∗,yc), c = 1, ..., C
computed on a test input x∗. The goal here is to reject
both unlabelled input x that have low probability under
p(x) (as a proxy to pD(x)), and labelled data (x,y) that
have low p(x,y) values. Concretely, the proposed detection
algorithms are as follows.
• Marginal detection: rejecting inputs that are far away
from the manifold.
One can select a threshold δ and reject an input x
if − log p(x) > δ. To determine the threshold δ,
we can compute d¯D = Ex∼D[− log p(x)] and σD =√
Vx∼D[log p(x)], then set δ = d¯D + ασD.
Figure 2. Visualising detection mechanisms. The scattered dots
are training data points, with different classes shown in different
colours (red for c = 0 and blue for c = 1). Same labels are
manually assigned for inputs when the detection method requires
y. Decision regions are shown in the corresponding colours. Input
points in the shaded area are rejected by detection methods.
• Logit detection: rejecting inputs using joint density.
Given a victim model y = F (x), one can reject x
if − log p(x, F (x)) > δy. We can use the mean and
variance statistics d¯c, σc computed on log p(x,yc) and
select δyc = d¯c + ασc.
• Divergence detection: rejecting inputs with over-
and/or under-confident predictions.
Denote p(x) as a C-dimensional probability vector
outputted by the classifier. For each class c, we
first collect the mean classification probability vector
pc = E(x,yc)∈D[p(x)], then compute the mean d¯c and
standard deviation σc on a selected divergence/distance
measure D[pc||p(x)] for all (x,yc) ∈ D. A test in-
put x∗ with prediction label c∗ = arg maxp(x∗) is
rejected if D[pc∗ ||p(x∗)] > d¯c∗ + ασc∗ . Therefore,
an example x∗ can be rejected if the probability vector
p(x∗) is very different to the ones seen in training.
When D is the KL-divergence, we call this method KL
detection. Other divergence/distance measures such as
total variation (TV) can also be used.
For better intuition, we visualise the detection mechanisms
in Figure 2 with a synthetic “two rings” binary classifica-
tion example. In this case we sample 2 × 1000 training
data points by y ∼ Bern(0.5), θ ∼ Uniform(0, 2pi),x|y ∼
N (x; cy + ry[cos(θ), sin(θ)]T, σ2I). We consider a gen-
erative classifier p(x,y) = p(x|y)pD(y), p(x|y) =
N (x;µy, σ2I),µy = arg min||xˆ−cy||2=ry ||x− xˆ||2. The
δ thresholds are selected to achieve 10% false positive rates
on training data. From the visualisations we see that inputs
that are far away from the model manifold are rejected by
marginal/logit detection. At the same time, logit detection
rejects data points that are not on the manifold of the given
class. KL/TV detection does not construct manifold-aware
acceptance regions, which is as expected since the proposed
divergence detection method does not require the classifier
to be generative. However, both detection methods have
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some success in rejecting uncertain predictions, especially
for TV, which also rejects ambiguous inputs (see the ring-
cross regions in the last two plots). Combining all three
methods, we see that the rejected inputs are either far away
from the manifold, or are ambiguous.
Detection methods using logit values have been used in
e.g. Li & Gal (2017); Feinman et al. (2017), but it is un-
clear whether the logits values in discriminative classifiers
have a semantic meaning. Song et al. (2018); Samangouei
et al. (2018); Kurakin et al. (2018) trained a separate gener-
ative model for denoising/detection. But the features of the
generator and the discriminative classifier can be very differ-
ent, hence the generator cannot detect the “manifold attack”
against the classifier (Gilmer et al., 2018). Unlike these ap-
proaches, we highlight three critical properties of generative
classifiers and the accompanied detection methods:
1. the representations of the data manifold are the same
for both the classifier and the detector (since they share
the same generative model p(x,y) ≈ pD(x,y);
2. the logit values in generative classifiers have a clear
semantic meaning: the log probability log p(x,y) of
generating the input x given the class label y = yc;
also note that F (x) = arg maxyc log p(x,yc);
3. the marginal/logit detection aims at rejecting x that has
low log p(x) and/or log p(x,y). These probabilities
are obtained as part of the classification procedure and
so do not require the running of any extra models.
Assuming an accurate approximation p(x,y) ≈ pD(x,y),
a new input x∗ is accepted by marginal/logit detection only
if x∗ is close to the manifold of F (x∗) (thus p(x∗,y =
F (x∗)) is high).1 So F (x∗) should be equal to the ground
truth label y∗ if x∗ is not an ambiguous input (which will be
detected by KL/TV detection). Therefore the “off-manifold”
conjecture should hold for a powerful generative classifier,
and below we present an empirical study to validate the
assumptions of this conjecture.
4. Experiments
We carry out a number of tests on the deep Bayes classifiers,
our implementation is available at https://github.
com/deepgenerativeclassifier/DeepBayes.
The distributions q(z|·) and p(z|·) are factorised Gaussians,
and the conditional probability p(x|·), if required, is param-
eterised by an `2 loss. Besides the LVM-based classifiers,
we further train a Bayesian neural network (BNN) with
Bernoulli dropout (dropout rate 0.3), as it has been shown
1Nalisnick et al. (2019) showed that existing generative models
fail to detect all possible outliers. A solution to counter this issue
in logit/marginal detection is to add a lower-bounding threshold so
that an input-output pair (x,y) will be rejected if− log p(x,y) <
ζy . We leave this investigation to future work.
in Li & Gal (2017) and Feinman et al. (2017) that BNNs
are more robust than their deterministic counterparts. The
constructed BNN has 2x more channels than LVM-based
classifiers, making the comparison slightly “unfair”, as the
BNN layers have more capacity. We use K = 10 Monte
Carlo samples for all the classifiers.
The adversarial attacks are taken from the CleverHans 2.0
library (Papernot et al., 2017a). Three metrics are reported:
accuracy of the classifier on crafted adversarial examples,
mean minimum perturbation distance computed on adver-
sarial examples that have successfully fooled the classifier,
and detection rate on successful attacks. This detection
rate is defined as the true positive (TP) rate of finding an
adversarial example, and the detection threshold is selected
to achieve a 5% false positive rate on clean training data.
The experiments are performed under various threat model
settings. In the main text we present gradient-based attacks
and gradient masking sanity checks, and provide a brief
summary of further experiments presented in the appendix.
Full table results can also be found in appendix F.
4.1. Gradient-based attacks
We first evaluate the robustness of generative classifiers
against gradient-based attacks. These attacks are performed
under a white-box setting against the classifier (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017b): the attacker can differentiate through the
classifier, but is not aware of the existence of the detec-
tor. We report results on two datasets (MNIST and CIFAR-
binary) and two classes of attacks (`∞ and `2 attacks).
Datasets For MNIST tests, we use dim(z) = 64 for the
LVM-based classifiers. All classifiers achieve > 98% clean
test accuracy, therefore we apply attacks on the whole test
dataset (10,000 datapoints). Since the robustness proper-
ties of MNIST classifiers might not extend to natural im-
ages (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b), we further consider the
same set of evaluations on CIFAR-binary, a binary classifi-
cation dataset containing “airplane” and “frog” images from
CIFAR-10. We choose to work with this simpler dataset
because (1) fully generative classifiers are less satisfactory
for classifying clean CIFAR-10 images2, and (2) we want
to evaluate whether the robustness properties of fully gener-
ative classifiers hold on natural images (c.f. Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017b). On CIFAR-binary, the generative classifiers
use dim(z) = 128 and obtain > 90% clean test accuracy
(see appendix). The attacks are then performed on the test
images that all models initially correctly classify, leading
to a test set of 1,577 instances for CIFAR-binary. For both
datasets the images are scaled to [0, 1].
2The clean test accuracies for GFZ & GFY on CIFAR-10 are
all < 50%; a conditional PixelCNN++ (Salimans et al., 2017)
(with much deeper networks) achieves 72.4% clean test accuracy.
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Figure 3. Victim accuracy, detection rates and minimum `inf perturbation against white-box FGSM attacks on MNIST. The higher the
better. The visualised adversarial examples (not necessarily successful) are crafted with with `∞ distortion  growing from 0.1 to 0.5.
Figure 4. Victim accuracy, detection rates and minimum `inf perturbation against white-box FGSM attacks on CIFAR-binary. The
higher the better. The visualised adversarial examples (not necessarily successful) are crafted with `∞ distortion  growing from 0.01 to
0.2.
`∞ attacks The attacks in test are: fast gradient sign
method (FGSM, Goodfellow et al., 2015), projected gra-
dient descent (PGD, Madry et al., 2018) and momentum
iterative method (MIM, Dong et al., 2018).3 We use the dis-
tortion strengths as  ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} for MNIST,
and  ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2} for CIFAR-binary.
Results are reported in Figure 3 for MNIST and Figure 4
for CIFAR-binary, respectively. For both datasets, genera-
tive classifiers perform generally better in terms of victim
accuracy, especially GBZ is significantly more robust than
the others on CIFAR-binary. By contrast, discriminative
VAE-based classifiers are less robust, e.g. on MNIST, DFX
& DFZ are not robust to the weakest attack (FGSM) even
when  = 0.2 (where the distorted inputs are still visually
close to the original digit “7”). Interestingly, DBX is rela-
tively robust against FGSM on both datasets, which agrees
with the preliminary tests in Alemi et al. (2017). Further
investigations in appendix A.2 show that the bottleneck
structure might be beneficial for defending certain attacks.
3See appendix B for MIM results with similar observations as
in the main text.
In terms of minimum perturbation which is computed across
all  settings,4 quantitatively the amount of distortion re-
quired to fool generative classifiers is much higher than
that for discriminative ones. Indeed on both datasets, the
visual distortion of the adversarial examples on generative
classifiers is more significant.
For detection, generative classifiers successfully detect the
adversarial examples with  ≥ 0.3 on MNIST, which is
reasonable as the visual distortion is already significant. De-
tection results on CIFAR-binary are less satisfactory though:
marginal/logit detection fail to detect attacks with  = 0.1
(which attain both high success rate and induce visually
perceptible distortion). These results suggest that the per-
pixel `2 loss might not be best suited for modelling natural
images (c.f. Larsen et al., 2016; van den Oord et al., 2016),
indeed we present improved robustness results in section
4.3, where the generative classifiers use an alternative likeli-
hood function that is closely related to the perceptual loss
(Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016; Johnson et al., 2016).
4We manually assign the minimum perturbation of an input as
max + 0.1 if none of the attacks is successful.
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Figure 5. Accuracy, `2 distortion, and detection rates against
white-box CW attacks on MNIST.
(a) clean inputs (b) CW adv. inputs
Figure 6. Clean inputs and CW adversarial examples (c = 10)
crafted on GFZ, digits in red rectangles show significant ambiguity.
As a side note, DFZ, as an intermediate between generative
and discriminative classifiers, has worse robustness results,
but has good detection performance for the marginal and
logit metrics. This is because with softmax activation, the
marginal distribution p(x) is dropped, but in marginal/logit
detection p(x) is still in use. KL detection works well for all
classifiers, and on CIFAR-binary, discriminative classifiers
start to dominate in this metric as  increases. Inspecting
the visualised adversarial examples on generative classifiers
(Figure 4), we see that for large  values, these inputs are
significantly distorted, thus “not ambiguous”, indeed they
are detected by marginal/logit detection methods.
`2 attack We perform the Carlini & Wagner (CW) `2
attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), with a loss-balancing pa-
rameter c ∈ {0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000}, so that the `2 distortion
regulariser in CW’s loss function decreases with larger c.
MNIST results are reported in Figure 5. Here GBZ is a clear
winner: for a given level of `2 distortion, GBZ is signifi-
cantly more robust than the others. Other classifiers perform
similarly on MNIST, however, these attack successes on
generative classifiers is mainly due to the ambiguity of the
crafted adversarial images. As visualised in Figure 6 (and
Figure B.4 in appendix), the induced distortion from CW
leads to ambiguous digits which sit at the perceptual bound-
ary between the original and the adversarial classes.
Figure 7. Accuracy, `2 distortion, and detection rates against
white-box CW attacks on CIFAR-binary.
Interestingly, the detection rates on MNIST adversarial in-
puts do not grow monotonically as c increases. Combined
with the victim accuracy results, this means c = 10 is the
sweet-spot parameter that achieves the best success rates
against both the classifier and the marginal/logit detection
methods. KL detection achieves > 95% detection rates
on all c and all the classifiers. This is as expected as the
CW attack generates adversarial examples that lead to mini-
mal difference between the logit values of the most and the
second most probable classes. In this case the adversarial
examples might correspond to ambiguous inputs (Figure 6).
Figure 7 presents the robustness and detection results for
CIFAR-binary. Here the generative classifiers are signif-
icantly more robust than the others (with the best being
GBZ), and the mean `2 distortions computed on successful
attacks are also significantly higher. The TP rates are low for
marginal/logit detection when c is small, which is reason-
able as the crafted images are visually similar to the clean
ones. Note that the distortion for the attacks on generative
classifiers is perceptible, and the logit TP rates also increase
as c increases. These results indicate that this CW attack is
ineffective when attacking generative classifiers.
Summary The tested generative classifiers are generally
more robust than the discriminative ones against white-box
gradient-based attacks. In particular, the generative classi-
fier’s victim accuracy decreases as the distortion increases,
but at the same time the TP rates for marginal/logit detection
also increase. Therefore the two attacks in test fail to find
near-manifold adversarial examples that fool both the clas-
sifier and the detector components of generative classifiers.
4.2. Sanity checks on gradient masking
If a successful defence against white-box gradient-based
attacks is due to gradient masking, then this defence is likely
to be less effective against attacks that do not differentiate
through the victim classifier and the defence (Papernot et al.,
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Table 1. Mean minimum `∞ perturbation (in red, computed on
 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}) and victim accuracy (in blue, for
 ≤ 0.3) for `∞ attacks on MNIST.
Attack GFZ GBZ GFY GBY
PGD (white) 0.23 / 7.71% 0.30 / 30.78% 0.21 / 5.52% 0.23 / 8.89%
MIM (white) 0.24 / 9.02% 0.21 / 4.97% 0.22 / 6.72% 0.21 / 1.54%
PGD (grey) 0.37 / 51.08% 0.36 / 50.64% 0.38 / 53.29% 0.36 / 48.66%
MIM (grey) 0.34 / 43.00% 0.33 / 40.94% 0.34 / 46.64% 0.33 / 40.06%
PGD (black) 0.40 / 61.93% 0.42 / 66.75% 0.38 / 56.35% 0.43 / 68.50%
MIM (black) 0.36 / 50.44% 0.38 / 59.86% 0.36 / 48.07% 0.39 / 61.78%
Table 2. Mean minimum `∞ perturbation (in red, computed on
 ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2}) and victim accuracy (in blue, for
 ≤ 0.1) for `∞ attacks on CIFAR-binary.
Attack GFZ GBZ GFY GBY
PGD (white) 0.11 / 21.81% 0.20 / 65.63% 0.11 / 25.81% 0.11 / 25.24%
MIM (white) 0.09 / 15.22% 0.13 / 37.60% 0.10 / 16.4%9 0.09 / 14.39%
PGD (grey) 0.15 / 50.48% 0.23 / 77.30% 0.16 / 54.66% 0.17 / 57.96%
MIM (grey) 0.15 / 47.62% 0.21 / 75.71% 0.15 / 51.11% 0.16 / 53.84%
PGD (black) 0.19 / 68.36% 0.23 / 79.45% 0.20 / 70.13% 0.19 / 67.98%
MIM (black) 0.18 / 66.39% 0.23 / 78.38% 0.19 / 68.42% 0.19 / 66.52%
2017b; Athalye et al., 2018). Therefore, here we present
two types of attacks as sanity checks on gradient masking.
Distillation-based attacks We perform two attacks based
on distilling the victim classifier using a “student” CNN.
The two attacks differ in their threat models: in the grey-
box setting the attacker has access to both the training data
and the output probability vectors of the classifiers on the
training set, while in the black-box setting the attacker only
has access to queried labels on a given input. For the lat-
ter black-box setting, we follow Papernot et al. (2017b) to
train a substitute CNN using Jacobian-based dataset aug-
mentation (see appendix E.1). We then craft adversarial
examples on the grey-/black-box substitutes using PGD and
MIN, and transfer them to the victim classifiers. As a sanity
check, these attacks with reasonably small  values achieve
∼ 100% success rates on fooling the substitutes ( ≥ 0.2
for MNIST and  ≥ 0.1 for CIFAR-binary, see appendix F).
We report the results for these transferred attacks in Table 1
for MNIST and Table 2 for CIFAR-binary, respectively, with
a comparison to white-box attack results taken from the last
section. It is clear that the adversarial examples crafted on
substitute models do not transfer very well to the generative
classifiers. Importantly, for a fixed  setting, the white-box
attacks achieve significantly higher success rates than their
grey-/black-box counterparts, and the gap is at least > 20%
for MNIST (with  ≤ 0.3) and > 30% for CIFAR-binary
(with  ≤ 0.1). Furthermore, the mean minimum `∞ pertur-
bation obtained by grey-/black-box attacks is significantly
higher than those obtained by white-box attacks.
SPSA (evolutionary strategies) We consider another
black-box setting that only assumes access to the logit val-
ues of the prediction given an input. We use the SPSA `∞
Table 3. Victim accuracy results against white-box PGD and
black-box SPSA attack. We use  = 0.3 for MNIST and
 = 0.05 for CIFAR-binary.
MNIST CIFAR-binary
PGD SPSA PGD SPSA
GFZ 4.0% 68.2% 67.7% 96.4%
GBZ 29.7% 79.0% 83.9% 95.2%
GBY 7.4% 71.0% 67.9% 96.4%
GFY 2.3% 55.9% 67.3% 96.3%
attack (Uesato et al., 2018), which is similar to the white-
box attacks, except that gradients are numerically estimated
using the logit values from the victim classifier. Results are
presented in Table 3 for MNIST (using 1,000 randomly sam-
pled test datapoints) and CIFAR-binary. Both experiments
clearly show that SPSA performs much worse on generative
classifiers when compared to white-box PGD.
Summary Both distillation-based attacks and score-based
attack (SPSA) failed to obtain higher success rate than
gradient-based attacks against generative classifiers. There-
fore, gradient masking is unlikely to be responsible for the
improved robustness of generative classifiers, as utilising the
exact gradient yielded better success rates for the attacks.
4.3. Combining deep Bayes and discriminative features
This experiment examines the robustness of CIFAR-10
multi-class classifiers, with the generative classifiers trained
on discriminative visual features. To do this, we down-
load a pretrained VGG16 network (Simonyan & Zisserman,
2014) on CIFAR-10 (93.59% test accuracy),5 and use its
features φ(x) as the input to the VAE-based classifiers:
p(y|x) = p(y|φ(x)). This means p(x|·) of the generative
classifiers is defined by a perceptual loss (Dosovitskiy &
Brox, 2016; Johnson et al., 2016), see appendix C for a dis-
cussion. The classifiers in test include GBZ, GBY and DBX.
We use fully-connected neural networks for these classifiers,
and select from VGG16 the 9th convolution layer (CONV9)
and the first fully connected layer after convolution (FC1)
as the feature layers to ensure ∼ 90% test accuracy.
Results on white-box `∞ attacks are visualised in Figure 8.
For all LVM-based classifiers we see clear improvements in
robustness and detection over the VGG16 baseline. In partic-
ular, GBZ and GBY with CONV9 features are overall better
than DBX. More importantly, generative classifiers based
on CONV9 features are significantly more robust than those
based on FC1 features. By contrast, for DBX, which is dis-
criminative, the robustness results are very similar. This in-
dicates that the level of feature representation has little effect
for DBX, presumably DBX-CONV9 has learned high-level
features that resembles FC1. Also the logit detection method
5https://github.com/geifmany/cifar-vgg
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Figure 8. Accuracy and detection rates against white-box `∞ at-
tacks on CIFAR-10. The higher the better. Note that results for
DBX, GBZ-FC1 and GBY-FC1 are almost identical.
works much better on the fusion models when compared
with the generative classifiers using `2 likelihood (c.f. Fig-
ure 4). These results suggest that one can achieve both high
clean accuracy and better robustness/detection rates against
adversaries by combining discriminatively learned visual
features and generative classifiers.
4.4. Summary of additional studies
We present in appendix A further studies on the robustness
properties of generative and discriminative classifiers.
• In appendix A.1, we designed a white-box attack tar-
geting both the classifier and the detector, which also
considers the usage of random z samples by the LVM-
based classifiers (Biggio et al., 2013; Carlini & Wagner,
2017b). In results, although this attack can reduce de-
tection levels, it comes with the trade-off of increasing
accuracy, suggesting that this adversary cannot break
both the classifier and detector working in tandem.
• In appendix A.2, we quantified the bottleneck effect
by varying dim(z) in Bottleneck classifiers. Results
indicate that using a small bottleneck improves the
robustness of the classifier against `∞ attacks.
• In appendix A.3, we evaluated the transferability of ad-
versarial examples accross different LVM-based clas-
sifiers. We found that these transferred attacks are
relatively effective between generative classifiers, but
not from generative to discriminative (and vice versa).
5. Discussion
We have proposed deep Bayes as a generative classifier that
uses deep LVMs to model the joint distribution of input-
output pairs. We have given evidence that generative clas-
sifiers are more robust to many recent adversarial attacks
than discriminative classifiers. Furthermore, the logit in
generative classifiers has a well-defined meaning and can
be used to detect attacks, even when the classifier is fooled.
Concurrent to us, Schott et al. (2019) also demonstrated
the robustness of generative classifiers on MNIST, in which
their graphical model corresponds to GFY in our design,
and the logits are computed by a tempered version of the
variational lower-bound. However, their approach requires
thousands of random z samples and tens of optimisation
steps to approximate log p(x|y) for every input-output pair
(x,y), making it much less scalable than our importance
sampling technique. Indeed, we have scaled our approach
to CIFAR-10, a natural image dataset, and the robustness
results are consistent with those on MNIST.
Importantly, the graphical model structure has a significant
impact on robustness, which is not mentioned in Schott
et al. (2019). Our study shows that deep LVM-based gen-
erative classifiers generally outperform the (randomised)
discriminative ones, and the bottleneck is useful for defend-
ing against `∞ attacks. Our results corroborate with the
Bayesian neural network literature, in particular Li & Gal
(2017); Feinman et al. (2017); Carlini & Wagner (2017b), in
showing that modelling unobserved variables are effective
for defending against adversarial attacks.
While we have given strong evidence to suggest that genera-
tive classifiers are more robust to current adversarial attacks,
we do not wish to claim that these models will be robust
to all possible attacks. Aside from many recent attacks be-
ing designed specifically for discriminative neural networks,
there is also evidence for the fragility of generative models;
e.g. naive Bayes as a standard approach for spam filtering
is well-known to be fragile (Dalvi et al., 2004; Huang et al.,
2011), and recently Tabacof et al. (2016); Kos et al. (2017);
Creswell et al. (2017) also designed attacks for (uncondi-
tional) VAEs. However, generative classifiers can be made
more robust too, to counter these weaknesses. Dalvi et al.
(2004) have shown that generative classifiers can be made
more secure if aware of the attack strategy, and Biggio et al.
(2011; 2014) further improved naive Bayes’ robustness by
modelling the conditional distribution of the adversarial
inputs. These approaches are similar to the adversarial train-
ing of discriminative classifiers (Trame`r et al., 2018; Madry
et al., 2018), efficient ways for doing so with generative
classifiers can be an interesting research direction.
But even with this note of caution, we believe this work
offers exciting avenues for future work. Using generative
classifiers offers an interesting way to evaluate generative
models and can drive improvements in their ability to tackle
high-dimensional datasets, where traditionally generative
classifiers have been less accurate than discriminative clas-
sifiers (Efron, 1975; Ng & Jordan, 2002). In addition, the
combination of generative and discriminative models is a
compelling direction for future research. Overall, we be-
lieve that progress on generative classifiers can inspire better
designs of attack, defence and detection techniques.
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Figure A.1. Accuracy and detection rates of DBX, GBY, and GBZ against PGD-based white-box (WB) attacks ( = 0.2, λdetect = 0.1) on
MNIST. The solid area denotes accuracy and the hatched area denotes the proportion of detected successful attacks with each considered
detector. See text for the descriptions of the labels.
Table A.1. WB+S+L attacks on MNIST with  = 0.2 and λdetect ∈ {0.0, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0} (for attacking logit detection). The λdetect values
are shown in parentheses. The WB+S attack uses λdetect = 0. The white-box (WB) attack (against classifier only) results in the main text
are included for reference.
model metric WB WB+S (0) WB+S+L (0.1) WB+S+L (1.0) WB+S+L (10.0)
GBZ victim acc. 57.4 35.5 44.6 71.2 90.5
detect rate 66.3 90.7 69.9 22.4 11.5
GBY victim acc. 35.9 22.0 52.0 71.2 93.3
detect rate 79.3 91.9 66.9 22.4 17.2
A. Further experiments
A.1. A white-box attack against both the classifier and the detection mechanism
We design a white-box attack against both the classifier and the detection mechanism, where the attacker knows everything
about the victim system: it has access to the training data, can differentiate through both the classifier and the detector, and
knows the usage of random z samples by the VAE-based classifiers (Biggio et al., 2013; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). This
PGD-based `∞ attack is designed following Carlini & Wagner (2017b): we construct an (approximate) Bayes classifier
pk(y|x) using (2) for each set of samples {zkc }Cc=1, and minimize the following with PGD:
L(η) =
K∑
k=1
log pk(y|x+ η) + λdetect max(0,Φ(x+ η,y)− δ), pk(y|x) = softmaxCc=1
[
log
p(x,y = yc, z
k
c )
q(zkc |x,y = yc)
]
. (3)
The detection statistic Φ(x+ η,y) is − log p(x+ η) for marginal detection, and δ is the corresponding threshold computed
on training data. For logit/KL detection, the detection statistics and thresholds are constructed accordingly.
We refer the attack that considers the random sampling of z in the classifier only as the ”white-box+sampling (WB+S)”
attack, which corresponds to the case that λdetect = 0. When λdetect is non-zero and the marginal log probability is used
as the detection statistic, the corresponding attack is labelled as ”white-box+sampling+marginal detection (WB+S+M)”.
Similarly we also label the attacks for logit and KL detections as WB+S+L and WB+S+K, respectively. The white-box
attack presented in the main text did not consider either randomness or detection, and we label this attack as WB.
Results are visualised in Figure A.1 for MNIST ( = 0.2, λdetect = 0.1). Here we consider two metrics: the accuracy of the
classifier against the attack (shown by solid bars), and the detection rates of successful attacks (shown by hatched bars, as
the absolute percentage of detected successful attacks in all tested inputs). We see that although the attacker can reduce
detection levels, this comes with the trade-off of increasing accuracy, suggesting that an adversary cannot break both the
classifier and detector working in tandem.
To further understand how the generative model’s classifier and detector components interact, we tune the λdetect parameters
to trade-off between the classification loss and the detection loss. With larger λdetect values the attack focuses on fooling
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Figure A.2. Accuracy and detection rates of DBX, GBY, and GBZ against PGD-based white-box (WB) attacks ( = 0.1, λdetect = 1.0) on
CIFAR binary task. The solid area denotes accuracy and the hatched area denotes the proportion of detected successful attacks with each
considered detector. See text for the descriptions of the labels.
the detection algorithm, on the other hand with small λdetect values the attack focuses on making the generative classifier
predict wrong class labels. More specifically when λdetect = 0, the corresponding WB+S attack only focuses on fooling
the classifier and thus it should achieve the highest success rate. Indeed this is shown in Table A.1 for attacks on MNIST:
WB+S achieves the lowest victim accuracy when compared with other WB+S+L attacks with non-zero λdetect values, also
it out-performs the WB attack by a large margin. However the success in fooling the classifier comes with the price of
increased logit detection rates: the detection rate increases when the victim accuracy decreases. Therefore these results
provide evidence that the designed attack cannot break both the classifier and the detector simultaneously.
Figure A.2 shows the WB+S+(M/L/K) attacks on CIFAR-binary ( = 0.1, λdetect = 1.0). Again we see that on GBZ,
although the attack is effective for the detection schemes, it comes with the price of decreased mis-classification rates.
Interestingly GBY seems to be robust to this attack, where the accuracy on the crafted adversarial examples increase.
Another surprising finding is that the attack results seem to be insensitive to the λdetect values in use. E.g. for WB+S+L
attacks we tuned λdetect ∈ {0.1, 1.0, 10.0, 100.0, 1000.0, 10000.0}, and the results are almost the same as reported in Figure
A.2: victim accuracy results are around 60%/30% for GBZ/GBY, and logit detection rates are around 6%/1%. As the
low detection rates indicate that the adversarial examples are close the generative model’s manifold, we conjecture that the
reason for this insensitivity is that the adversary has found the same “hole” of model density near the model manifold for
all λdetect settings. This also indicates that the generative model’s manifold might not be a good approximation to the data
manifold, due to the use of `2 likelihood function in pixel space which is sub-optimal for natural images. See discussions in
the main text and also section C.
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Figure A.3. Accuracy and detection rates against white-box `∞ attacks on MNIST, with varied bottleneck layer sizes.
Table A.2. Clean test accuracy on MNIST classification (with varied bottleneck layer sizes).
dim(z) = 16 dim(z) = 32 dim(z) = 64 dim(z) = 128
DBX 99.11% 99.01% 98.98% 98.91%
GBZ 97.11% 97.08% 97.45% 96.62%
GBY 98.82% 98.95% 98.72% 98.75%
A.2. Quantifying the effect of the bottleneck layer
We see from the main text that classifiers with bottleneck structure may be preferred for resisting adversarial examples. To
quantify this bottleneck effect, we train on MNIST models DBX, GBZ and GBY with z dimensions in {16, 32, 64, 128}
(the main text experiments use dim(z) = 64). The clean test accuracy is shown in Table A.2, showing that all models in test
perform reasonably well.
We repeat the same white-box `∞ attack experiments as done in the main text, where results are presented in Figure A.3. It is
clear that for discriminative classifiers, DBX, the models become less robust as the bottleneck dimension dim(z) increases.
Interestingly DBX classifiers seem to be very robust against FGSM attacks, which agrees with the results in Alemi et al.
(2017). For the generative ones, we also observe similar trends (although less significant) of decreased robustness for GBY
classifiers, and for GBZ the trend is unclear, presumably due to local optimum issues in optimisation. In summary, GBZ
classifiers are generally more robust compared to GBY classifiers. More importantly, when the accuracy of generative
classifiers on adversarial images decreases to zero, the detection rates with marginal/logit detection increases to 100%. This
clearly shows that the three attacks tested here cannot fool the generative classifiers without being detected.
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Figure A.4. Results on cross-model transfer attacks on MNIST. Here we select  = 0.3. The horizontal axis corresponds to the source
victim that the adversarial examples are crafted on, and the vertical axis corresponds to the target victim that the attacks are transferred to.
The higher (i.e. the lighter) the better.
Figure A.5. Results on cross-model transfer attacks on CIFAR-binary. Here we select  = 0.1. The horizontal axis corresponds to the
source victim that the adversarial examples are crafted on, and the vertical axis corresponds to the target victim that the attacks are
transferred to. The higher (i.e. the lighter) the better.
A.3. Cross-model attack transferability
Papernot et al. (2016a) has shown that adversarial examples transfer well between classifiers that have similar decision
boundaries. Therefore we consider the cross-model transferability of the attacks crafted on generative models to discrimina-
tive classifiers (and vise versa), in order to understand whether the difference between them are significant. Here we take
adversarial examples crafted in the white-box setting with PGD and MIM on one classifier, and transfer successful attacks to
other classifiers.
We report in Figure A.4 and Figure A.5 the transferability results of the crafted adversarial examples between different
models. We see that in both MNIST and CIFAR-binary experiments, adversarial example transfer is relatively effective
between generative classifiers but not from generative to discriminative (and vice versa). Within the class of generative
classifiers, GBZ is the most robust one against transferred attacks. Meanwhile, GBZ’s adversarial examples transfer less well
to other generative classifiers. This means the decision boundary of GBZ might be different from the other three generative
classifiers, which potentially explains GBZ’s best robustness performance in white-box attack experiments (see main text).
On the other hand, the attacks crafted on DBX do not transfer in general, while at the same time, DBX is the least robust
model in this case.
For detection, the generative classifiers obtain very high detection rates on all transferred attacks on MNIST (> 95%).
However, on CIFAR-binary the TP rates for logit detection are significantly lower than in the MNIST case, which is similar
to the observations in white-box attack experiments (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, the detection rates for the “discriminative
to generative” transfer are considerably higher.
In summary, the transferrability test indicate that generative and discriminative classifiers are very diferrent in terms of the
decision boundaries. Also generative classifiers are more robust against the tested transfer attacks across different models.
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Figure B.1. Victim accuracy, detection rates and minimum `∞ perturbation against white-box MIM attack on MNIST. The higher the
better. The visualised adversarial examples are crafted with `∞ distortion  growing from 0.1 to 0.5.
Figure B.2. Victim accuracy, detection rates and minimum `∞ perturbation against white-box MIM attack on CIFAR-binary. The higher
the better. The visualised adversarial examples are crafted with `∞ distortion  growing from 0.01 to 0.2.
Table B.1. Clean test accuracy on CIFAR plane-vs-frog classification.
BNN GFZ GFY DFZ DFX DBX GBZ GBY
97.00% 91.60% 91.20% 94.85% 95.65% 96.00% 89.35% 90.65
Table B.2. Clean test accuracy on CIFAR-10 classification.
VGG16 GBZ-FC1 GBY-FC1 DBX-FC1 GBZ-CONV9 GBY-CONV9 DBX-CONV9
93.59% 92.55% 93.21% 93.49% 91.76% 88.33% 93.21%
B. Additional results for main text experiments
B.1. White-box MIM attack results
We visualise the white-box MIM attack results in Figure B.1 for MNIST and Figure B.2 for CIFAR-binary, respectively.
Again the generative classifiers are generally more robust than the discriminative ones. Similarly the logit/marginal detection
methods successfully detect the adversarial examples when  increases.
Interestingly DBX seems to be robust to MIM on MNIST (but not on CIFAR-binary). This robustness is also indicated by
the minimum perturbation figures, where on MNIST the mean minimum perturbation on DBX is the highest. Since MIM is
an iterative optimisation version of FGSM, this result seems to agree with FGSM results on MNIST (see main text), as
well as the observations in Alemi et al. (2017). Furthermore, a sanity check shows that MIM achieves 100% success rate
on DBX when  = 0.9, therefore gradient masking is unlikely to explain the success of the bottleneck effect on MNIST
classifiers (Athalye et al., 2018).
B.2. Clean test accuracy on CIFAR-binary & CIFAR-10
We present in Table B.1 the clean accuracy on CIFAR-binary test images (2000 in total).
We present in Table B.2 the clean accuracy for the fusion models on CIFAR-10 test images.
B.3. Full results for the fusion model experiments
We present in B.3 the full results of the CIFAR-10 experiments. The observations in MIM experiments are similar to those in
FGSM & PGD experiments, specifically for GBZ, using CONV9 features returns significantly improved robustness results.
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Figure B.3. Victim accuracy and detection rates against white-box attacks on CIFAR-10. The higher the better.
B.4. Visualising CW-`2 adversarial examples
We visualise in Figure B.4 the crafted adversarial images using white-box CW attack, where successful attacks are in red
rectangles. We clearly see that many of the successful adversarial examples crafted on the generative classifiers sit at the
boundary of two classes (thus ambiguous). For example, many digit “4” clean images are distorted to resemble digit ”9”.
Similarly many digit “1” clean images are distorted to resemble digits “7” and (very thin) “3” and “8”. On the other hand,
we see less ambiguity from the successful attacks on discriminative classifiers. Therefore we conclude that the perceptual
distortion of CW attacks on generative and discriminative classifiers are very different.
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(a) clean inputs (b) adv. inputs (BNN) (c) adv. inputs (GFZ)
(d) adv. inputs (GFY) (e) adv. inputs (DFZ) (f) adv. inputs (DFX)
(g) adv. inputs (DBX) (h) adv. inputs (GBZ) (i) adv. inputs (GBY)
Figure B.4. Visualising the clean inputs of MNIST and the CW (c = 10) adversarial examples crafted on all the classifiers. Digits in red
rectangles are successful attacks, and digits in green rectangles are unsuccessful attacks.
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C. Further discusssions
C.1. The fusion model for vision tasks: connections to perceptual loss
The CIFAR-binary experiments in the main text indicate that likelihood functions based on per-pixel `2 loss in the observation
space are less suitable for modelling natural images. This observation has also been made in the deep generative models
literature, and in particular, the generative adversarial network approach (GAN Goodfellow et al., 2014) can be viewed as
evaluating the quality of “perceptually realistic image generations” using discriminative features. Following this principle,
researchers have scaled GAN-based approaches to generate high resolution images (Karras et al., 2018).
Similarly, the computer vision community has discovered that “distances” defined on the features of a discriminatively
trained deep CNN work surprisingly well to perceptually measure the similarity of two images. Indeed, recent research
proposed the perceptual loss (Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016; Johnson et al., 2016) as the `2 distance between convolutional
features extracted from a very deep CNN (e.g. VGG):
`perceptual(x1,x2) := ||φ(x1)− φ(x2)||2, φ(x) = CNN-conv-layer(x).
This perceptual loss has been successfully applied to neural style transfer, super-resolution and conditional image synthesis
(Gatys et al., 2016; Dosovitskiy & Brox, 2016; Ledig et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2016).
Critically, we highlight an empirical study from Zhang et al. (2018): when comparing the “perceptual similarity” between
two images, decisions based on the perceptual loss are well-aligned with human judgements. This alignment of perceptual
loss to human vision also explains the success of the fusion model presented in the main text. Here the discriminative VGG
features are used to construct the perceptual loss, which is used by the generative classifiers to measure the closeness of a
new input x∗ to the manifold of clean images (estimated from training data). By contrast, discriminative classifiers (e.g. the
original VGG classifier), when making decisions, do not explicitly take into account the “perceptual similarity” of the input
to the images in the predicted catergory. Therefore an adversarial image containing a “cat” can easily fool the discriminative
classifier to predict a “dog” class label.
Still we note that the fusion model in practice is unlikely to be robust to all attacks. The alignment of human vision and
the perceptual loss with current deep CNNs is not perfect, therefore under the white-box setting against the whole system,
an attacker might be able to craft an adversarial example that has minimum `2, `∞ or even `0 distortion, but at the same
time has minimum “perceptual distance” to the image manifold of the incorrect class. Much future work is to be done on
improving representation learning for perceptual losses, as well as on investigating the adversarial robustness of the fusion
model under different threat models.
Are Generative Classifiers More Robust to Adversarial Attacks?
D. Model architectures
MNIST experiments The VAEs are constructed with convolutional encoders and deconvolutional generators. More
specifically, the encoder network for q(z|x,y) is the same across all VAE-based classifiers. It starts with a 3-layer
convolutional neural network with 5× 5 filters and 64 channels, with a max-pooling operation after each convolution. Then,
the convolutional network is followed by a MLP with 2 hidden layers, each with 500 units, to produce the mean and variance
parameters of q. The label y is injected into the MLP at the first hidden layer, as a one hot encoding (i.e. for MNIST, the
first hidden layer has 500+10 units). The latent dimension is dim(z) = 64.
The p models’ architectures are the following:
• GFZ: For p(y|z) we use a MLP with 1 hidden layer composed of 500 units. For p(x|y, z) we used an MLP with 2
hidden layers, each with 500 units, and 4× 4× 64 dimension output, followed by a 3-layer deconvolutional network
with 5× 5 kernel size, stride 2 and [64, 64, 1] channels.
• GFY: We use an MLP with 1 hidden layer composed of 500 units for p(z|y), and the same architecture as GFZ for
p(x|y, z).
• DFZ: We use almost the same deconvolutional network architecture for p(x|z) as GFZ’s p(x|y, z) network, except
that the input is z only. For p(y|x, z) we use almost the same architecture as q(z|x,y) except that the injected input
to the MLP is z and the MLP output is the set of logit values for y.
• DFX: We use the same architecture as G3 for p(y|x, z). The network for p(z|x) is almost identical except that there is
no injected input to the MLP, and the network returns the mean and variance parameters for q(z|x).
• DBX: We use GFZ’s architecture for p(y|z) and DFX’s architecture for p(z|x).
• GBY: We use GFY’s architecture for p(z|y) and DFZ’s architecture for p(x|z).
• GBZ: We use GFZ’s architecture for p(y|z) and DFZ’s architecture for p(x|z).
The BNN has almost the same architecture as the encoder network q, except that it uses 2x the hidden units/channels, and
the last layer is 10 dimensions. Note that here we used dropout as it is convenient to implement, and we expect better
approximate inference methods (such as stochastic gradient MCMC) to return better results for robustness and detection.
CIFAR-binary experiments The model architectures are almost the same as used in MNIST experiments, except that the
hidden layer dimensions for the MLP layers are increased to 1000. For the encoder q, the channels are increased to [64, 128,
256]. For the p models, the deconvolutional networks have different channel values, [128, 64, 3], and the MLP before the
deconvolution outputs a 4× 4× 256 vector (before reshaping). The BNN has 2x the channels but still uses 1000 hidden
units.
CIFAR-10 experiments The pre-trained VGG16 network is downloaded from https://github.com/geifmany/
cifar-vgg, where the CONV9 and FC1 layers correspond to:
• CONV9: https://github.com/geifmany/cifar-vgg/blob/master/cifar10vgg.py#L82
• FC1: https://github.com/geifmany/cifar-vgg/blob/master/cifar10vgg.py#L109
The VAE-based classifiers build fully connected networks on top of the extracted features, and use dim(z) = 128 for
bottleneck. The encoder q(z|φ(x),y) has the network architectures [dim(φ(x)) + dim(y), 1000, 1000, dim(z) × 2], and
we use the same encoder architecture across all classifiers. The decoder architectures are as follows:
• DBX: We use an MLP of layers [dim(z), 1000, dim(y)] for p(y|z) and an MLP of layers [dim(φ(x)), 1000, 1000,
dim(z) × 2] for p(z|φ(x)).
• GBZ: We use an MLP of layers [dim(z), 1000, 1000, dim(y)] for p(y|z) and an MLP of layers [dim(z), 1000, 1000,
dim(φ(x))] for p(φ(x)|z).
• GBY: We use an MLP of layers [dim(y), 1000, dim(z) × 2] for p(z|y) and GBZ’s architecture for p(φ(x)|z).
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E. Attack settings
We use the Cleverhans package to perform attacks. We use the default hyper-parameters, if not specifically stated.
PGD: We perform the attack for 40 iterations with step-size 0.01.
MIM: We perform the attack for 40 iterations with step-size 0.01 and decay factor 1.0.
CW-`2: We use learning rate 0.01 for c = 0.1, 1, 10, learning rate 0.03 for c = 100, and learning rate 0.1 for c = 1000. We
set the confidence parameter to 0, and we optimise the loss for 1000 iterations.
SPSA: We use almost the same hyper-parameters as in Uesato et al. (2018) except for the number of samples for gradient
estimates. In detail, we perform the attack for 100 iterations with perturbation size 0.01, Adam learning rate 0.01, stopping
threshold -5.0 and 2000 samples for each gradient estimate.
E.1. Jacobian-based dataset augmentation
The black-box distillation attack is based on Papernot et al. (2017b), which trains a substitute CNN using Jacobian-based
dataset augmentation. Assume y = F (x) is the output one-hot vector of the victim, and p(x) is the probability vector
output of the substitute model, then at the tth outer-loop, we train the substitute CNN on dataset Dt = {(xn,yn)} with
queried yn for 10 epochs, and augment the dataset by
Dt+1 = Dt ∪ {(xˆ, F (xˆ)) | xˆ = x+ λ∇xp(x)Ty, (x,y) ∈ Dt}. (4)
We initialise D1 with 200× 10 datapoints from the MNIST test set, select λ = 0.1, and run the algorithm for 6 outer-loops.
On MNIST, this results in 64, 000 queried inputs, and∼ 96% accuracy of the substitute model on test data. On CIFAR binary
classification, we use 200× 2 datapoints for the inital query set D1, resulting in 12, 800 queries in total. The substitutes
achieved almost the same accuracy as their corresponding victim models on clean test datapoints.
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F. Results in tables
We present in tables the full results of the experiments.
See Tables F.1 to F.10 for the white-box attacks.
See Tables F.11 to F.16 for the grey-box attacks.
See Tables F.17 to F.22 for the black-box attacks.
See Tables F.23 to F.25 for CIFAR-10 results with VGG-based classifiers.
See Tables F.26 to F.28 for bottleneck effect quantification results.
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Table F.1. FGSM white-box attack results on MNIST.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
BNN 92.4 67.8 40.5 26.2 20.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.0 94.2 95.4 95.5 96.5
GFZ 94.2 74.5 38.9 12.9 5.7 43.6 79.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 56.4 89.6 99.9 100.0 100.0 89.2 91.7 92.2 92.5 92.2
GBZ 92.5 80.3 62.0 42.4 27.2 37.0 81.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 57.6 93.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.6 90.9 90.3 91.1 91.5
GFY 94.3 74.8 46.5 21.7 10.5 53.1 92.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.2 97.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.8 93.1 93.8 94.2 94.2
GBY 93.6 76.4 47.5 22.3 10.7 41.9 84.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 57.7 92.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.3 92.7 92.8 92.9 92.9
DFX 70.1 14.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.6 93.8 93.8 93.5 94.3
DBX 91.6 77.8 58.1 44.5 36.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.6 93.6 95.2 96.3 97.0
DFZ 75.2 19.0 2.4 1.1 1.0 12.6 50.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 26.9 65.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.1 95.1 94.5 94.9 94.8
Table F.2. PGD white-box attack results on MNIST.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
BNN 83.2 12.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.1 92.1 88.7 20.4 0.2
GFZ 86.7 37.7 7.7 1.2 0.3 43.2 71.8 91.4 99.4 100.0 55.8 77.1 94.8 99.6 100.0 90.3 92.1 90.9 90.4 89.7
GBZ 85.1 57.4 32.5 19.3 11.6 33.7 50.3 84.4 99.7 100.0 52.2 66.3 91.5 99.8 100.0 90.0 91.5 91.5 91.7 91.8
GFY 79.7 27.4 5.6 1.2 0.3 58.1 87.9 98.0 100.0 100.0 68.7 92.2 99.3 100.0 100.0 92.6 92.5 90.7 90.7 85.4
GBY 86.7 35.9 9.0 1.7 0.4 45.3 76.1 94.6 99.7 100.0 56.9 79.3 95.6 99.9 100.0 90.1 92.1 91.6 91.7 91.4
DFX 47.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.8 89.8 13.3 31.4 42.8
DBX 58.0 18.3 6.0 1.3 0.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.7 94.0 94.1 93.7 84.8
DFZ 49.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 44.3 94.1 100.0 100.0 25.9 57.6 94.5 99.9 100.0 93.9 89.8 12.1 22.9 28.0
Table F.3. MIM white-box attack results on MNIST.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
BNN 82.0 7.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.2 91.1 72.0 64.5 7.1
GFZ 87.0 40.4 9.0 1.2 1.2 43.5 83.8 98.4 99.4 99.4 57.6 89.3 98.6 99.2 99.2 91.5 92.3 92.0 90.6 90.6
GBZ 79.6 27.4 5.6 1.5 0.5 36.1 86.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 53.5 93.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 91.3 91.4 91.9 92.2 92.7
GFY 80.8 30.1 6.8 1.4 1.4 56.0 93.7 99.8 100.0 100.0 68.1 96.6 99.9 100.0 100.0 90.9 92.4 92.0 91.6 91.6
GBY 84.9 22.9 1.5 0.1 0.0 47.4 91.2 99.9 100.0 100.0 59.8 92.8 99.9 100.0 100.0 91.4 92.1 91.2 86.8 29.0
DFX 48.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.2 89.6 9.2 17.5 17.5
DBX 66.7 28.7 19.7 17.2 17.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.5 94.3 94.6 94.7 94.7
DFZ 50.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 50.7 99.4 100.0 100.0 26.4 63.2 99.0 100.0 100.0 94.3 89.8 11.5 17.3 17.3
Table F.4. CW white-box attack results on MNIST.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00
BNN 98.6 50.2 24.4 19.7 38.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 85.6 96.2 93.6 94.0 96.5
GFZ 98.7 76.7 28.6 20.8 28.4 45.4 25.1 11.7 17.9 49.2 62.0 39.2 25.3 29.9 57.4 91.1 94.9 95.3 93.5 94.8
GBZ 97.3 95.3 81.5 80.2 66.6 35.1 29.0 10.8 14.0 38.2 56.3 50.6 26.2 29.2 55.8 85.3 89.9 90.8 91.8 91.7
GFY 98.7 70.4 28.6 25.0 33.7 52.7 37.5 21.2 29.0 59.7 68.5 51.1 33.5 39.4 67.2 91.4 96.3 96.0 94.4 95.3
GBY 98.5 77.7 32.7 26.8 38.1 44.7 26.4 12.1 18.8 52.8 56.8 39.7 22.3 27.1 59.6 90.0 95.5 94.5 92.9 94.8
DFX 96.5 64.7 20.3 11.8 2.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 96.7 99.9 100.0 99.7 97.8
DBX 97.1 83.3 30.2 10.9 29.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 90.0 93.4 96.7 96.1 97.5
DFZ 95.9 51.2 13.6 9.6 16.0 17.3 7.2 9.2 17.9 41.6 30.6 21.5 22.4 31.9 54.0 96.2 99.8 99.5 98.6 98.2
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Table F.5. WB+S+(M/L/K) attacks on MNIST. This is done using the PGD attack with  = 0.2 and λdetect = 0.1. ‘WB’ stands for attacks against the classifier only, ‘WB+S’ means the
adversary has knowledge of the K samples but not of the detection system. ‘WB+S+M’, ‘WB+S+L’, and ‘WB+S+K’ are attacks where the adversary has knowledge of the K samples
and of the marginal, logit and KL detection mechanisms respectively.
WB WB+S WB+S+M WB+S+L WB+S+K
acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL
DBX 18.3 N/A N/A 94 17 N/A N/A 93.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 35.9 N/A N/A 93.9
GBZ 57.4 50.3 66.3 91.5 35.5 82.2 90.7 91.4 47.9 36.5 67.4 91.3 44.6 50.5 69.9 91.0 45 73.0 84.8 91.5
GBY 35.9 76.1 79.3 92.1 22 90.8 91.9 92.1 43.8 47.0 61.9 91.1 52.0 56.4 66.9 90.6 32.8 89.2 91.8 93.3
Table F.6. FGSM white-box attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
BNN 98.2 93.2 58.5 14.5 6.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 58.6 55.1 65.5 54.0 58.5
GFZ 97.1 94.7 81.8 56.4 31.4 11.4 10.1 5.9 17.4 99.3 11.4 10.4 6.8 17.2 99.3 58.6 40.1 35.9 41.0 50.6
GBZ 95.1 93.5 87.1 74.9 62.0 26.0 18.6 15.5 38.6 99.6 26.3 20.3 19.1 41.9 99.6 35.5 41.5 47.0 43.7 45.6
GFY 96.5 94.2 80.7 56.7 32.0 9.6 9.2 6.9 18.8 99.0 17.6 13.1 8.1 20.8 99.1 46.6 43.7 36.1 39.5 49.3
GBY 96.1 92.9 82.0 60.5 36.3 17.2 15.1 8.1 28.5 99.2 20.2 18.1 10.0 31.1 99.2 49.7 48.0 39.2 38.7 47.3
DFX 83.8 42.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 63.3 66.6 48.4 97.7 100.0
DBX 90.9 78.6 50.7 31.7 18.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 50.7 58.7 56.8 59.7 57.2
DFZ 83.9 52.1 2.9 0.0 0.0 6.6 3.8 2.2 3.9 60.6 6.9 4.2 2.4 3.3 60.4 57.5 62.3 54.8 66.7 99.8
Table F.7. PGD white-box attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
BNN 97.9 86.7 19.7 1.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 41.7 59.4 55.7 68.4 98.9
GFZ 98.0 93.9 67.7 21.7 3.5 3.3 6.6 5.6 7.8 32.9 5.0 9.5 6.0 8.2 33.0 37.5 45.1 34.5 44.0 57.7
GBZ 94.6 93.7 83.9 67.4 52.8 19.8 17.9 12.8 14.3 43.1 22.8 19.5 17.4 17.0 44.3 32.1 39.3 40.2 37.1 33.2
GFY 98.4 95.0 67.9 25.8 4.1 4.2 6.7 6.4 7.8 35.7 3.1 8.2 7.6 7.8 33.8 31.2 43.6 32.9 39.6 53.3
GBY 96.4 92.9 67.3 25.7 6.9 11.1 8.4 7.9 11.6 41.4 13.1 11.5 9.2 12.2 40.3 43.0 43.0 33.6 39.1 52.2
DFX 82.7 35.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 64.1 64.7 69.6 100.0 100.0
DBX 83.3 34.6 4.2 0.7 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 59.8 59.5 65.1 78.7 93.4
DFZ 82.4 36.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.9 3.8 5.1 12.3 91.1 6.5 4.1 5.5 12.3 91.3 56.3 60.3 54.7 99.7 100.0
Table F.8. MIM white-box attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
BNN 96.9 84.6 18.7 0.9 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 35.9 54.7 56.3 62.4 78.8
GFZ 96.9 91.5 58.1 15.2 1.9 6.5 6.2 6.4 10.6 86.1 10.0 8.3 6.6 11.3 84.5 31.0 39.0 32.1 47.2 77.1
GBZ 92.5 89.4 71.5 40.4 17.9 15.0 13.2 11.0 24.0 95.9 16.4 14.8 12.8 25.1 96.0 42.5 37.5 31.0 37.4 55.0
GFY 97.6 92.3 59.5 16.5 2.3 5.6 6.9 6.3 13.3 88.1 5.7 6.2 6.8 13.8 87.6 23.8 41.4 33.8 43.9 74.6
GBY 95.1 88.8 56.5 14.6 1.3 15.1 9.5 8.6 19.2 97.3 15.3 10.7 9.9 18.5 97.0 51.1 43.2 31.7 46.7 87.6
DFX 82.5 35.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 65.5 67.1 69.6 100.0 100.0
DBX 82.5 38.8 6.1 1.2 0.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 54.6 60.0 61.5 78.8 88.5
DFZ 81.5 36.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 5.4 3.9 5.0 13.4 96.9 6.2 4.1 5.5 13.8 96.8 61.1 58.5 55.3 99.9 100.0
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Table F.9. CW white-box attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00
BNN 98.0 68.9 38.5 19.5 9.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 56.2 79.0 79.5 71.5 65.3
GFZ 99.5 95.6 76.5 56.7 43.4 0.0 4.5 2.6 5.9 14.7 0.0 4.6 3.0 6.4 14.0 29.2 30.4 25.6 28.1 33.2
GBZ 96.0 93.6 88.9 80.6 69.8 16.7 11.5 7.8 11.7 33.8 18.9 13.7 9.3 13.6 37.5 41.1 51.4 40.4 36.0 37.9
GFY 99.8 95.9 78.8 60.6 42.7 0.0 6.6 4.1 5.2 15.9 0.0 6.6 4.8 5.7 15.6 75.0 37.3 26.0 28.2 31.5
GBY 97.5 93.1 76.7 61.6 47.7 15.8 14.6 6.0 6.4 19.9 18.9 13.9 6.0 7.5 21.3 42.6 34.3 27.2 25.2 33.9
DFX 82.6 44.2 34.3 28.6 4.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 64.6
DBX 96.5 72.2 26.3 12.1 11.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 61.6 79.4 85.2 75.2 70.2
DFZ 94.5 72.3 29.9 12.9 4.8 7.3 5.8 4.3 4.6 5.7 14.1 6.9 5.0 4.9 6.3 82.6 97.3 97.1 90.0 68.8
Table F.10. WB+S+(M/L/K) attacks on CIFAR binary task. This is done using the PGD attack with  = 0.1 and λdetect = 1.0. ‘WB’ stands for attacks against the classifier only,
‘WB+S’ means the adversary has knowledge of the K samples but not of the detection system. ‘WB+S+M’, ‘WB+S+L’, and ‘WB+S+K’ are attacks where the adversary has knowledge
of the K samples and of the marginal, logit and KL detection mechanisms respectively.
WB WB+S WB+S+M WB+S+L WB+S+K
acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL acc. TP marg. TP logit TP KL
DBX 0.7 N/A N/A 78.7 0.7 N/A N/A 82.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.6 N/A N/A 82.6
GBZ 67.4 14.3 17.0 37.1 57 40.6 45.1 49 58.4 9.6 18.5 46.9 58.5 1.8 7.8 47.8 59.9 25.5 27.6 42.4
GBY 25.7 11.6 12.2 39.1 28.5 22.0 22.6 49 29.5 5.6 7.6 45.9 29.2 0.8 1.8 45.4 27.9 15.6 15.9 45
Table F.11. Grey-box PGD attack results on MNIST.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
GFZ 86.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.6 83.3 51.3 26.8 17.2 49.5 73.8 99.7 100.0 100.0
GBZ 81.2 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.5 80.1 55.3 35.0 25.2 46.7 73.3 99.6 100.0 100.0
GFY 84.8 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.7 82.3 55.2 33.5 24.0 58.7 88.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
GBY 86.7 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.8 81.6 51.0 27.5 18.1 50.1 78.5 99.9 100.0 100.0
DFX 74.2 5.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 91.7 57.7 19.6 4.3 1.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 80.6 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.2 59.2 22.5 10.9 8.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 69.6 3.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 91.9 57.2 21.4 6.3 2.6 33.6 55.1 91.7 100.0 100.0
Table F.12. Grey-box MIM attack results on MNIST.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
GFZ 87.2 16.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.5 82.4 42.8 14.2 3.7 50.6 82.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
GBZ 81.8 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.3 78.6 45.3 17.0 5.2 46.2 81.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
GFY 85.2 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.6 80.8 48.0 18.9 7.4 59.8 96.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
GBY 87.0 15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.7 79.9 41.8 13.0 4.0 51.4 87.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
DFX 76.5 12.3 3.6 2.1 2.1 91.5 56.1 22.2 9.9 9.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 85.1 19.9 0.6 0.1 0.1 93.4 57.0 14.1 6.3 6.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 70.9 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 91.8 54.6 16.4 2.7 0.3 34.5 63.8 98.9 100.0 100.0
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Table F.13. Grey-box CW attack results on MNIST.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00
GFZ 98.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.8 96.9 96.0 93.4 90.2 53.4 44.2 41.6 40.6 43.7
GBZ 98.4 63.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.4 95.4 92.9 88.6 84.5 45.9 39.7 33.0 31.2 38.6
GFY 98.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 97.6 97.0 95.7 94.0 61.0 55.2 49.2 49.5 52.7
GBY 98.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.7 96.8 96.0 93.8 91.2 54.2 41.5 37.6 38.7 43.6
DFX 85.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.6 93.3 91.2 90.4 89.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 97.3 46.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 98.7 93.9 88.4 85.5 76.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 80.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.2 94.6 92.3 91.5 91.2 32.9 28.6 28.1 36.5 44.5
Table F.14. Grey-box PGD attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
GFZ 96.7 88.1 41.7 4.5 0.1 97.0 94.9 84.0 48.3 8.3 8.4 11.2 6.1 7.5 49.8
GBZ 92.9 83.1 37.8 5.5 0.0 95.3 94.8 91.8 83.1 65.6 15.5 12.8 10.9 19.9 79.8
GFY 96.9 88.1 33.7 3.3 0.1 96.9 95.9 85.3 54.2 12.7 2.6 2.0 5.0 8.5 61.2
GBY 95.2 85.6 32.4 2.8 0.1 96.8 95.3 86.4 59.8 18.5 21.8 14.3 10.5 12.5 75.2
DFX 95.7 80.8 10.1 0.2 0.0 99.1 96.7 79.4 28.3 0.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 95.7 80.5 30.5 1.7 0.0 99.5 98.2 91.1 65.1 21.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 96.5 81.9 10.5 0.3 0.0 99.1 96.9 76.9 26.2 1.3 4.5 16.5 6.1 8.5 59.6
Table F.15. Grey-box MIM attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
GFZ 96.3 87.9 42.1 4.7 0.1 97.1 94.8 83.0 44.8 4.9 8.7 11.1 5.8 8.5 75.1
GBZ 92.9 82.5 36.9 4.9 0.0 95.5 94.7 91.4 81.7 49.5 14.8 12.6 13.9 21.9 97.8
GFY 96.8 87.9 34.1 3.5 0.1 96.9 95.6 84.6 49.1 6.9 2.6 2.0 6.7 10.3 81.1
GBY 95.1 85.5 32.0 2.6 0.1 96.8 95.5 85.7 56.2 10.9 21.8 14.8 9.2 13.4 97.6
DFX 95.5 80.5 10.5 0.2 0.0 99.1 96.5 77.3 24.0 0.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 95.6 81.1 34.5 2.2 0.0 99.5 98.3 89.3 58.9 9.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 96.3 81.5 10.7 0.5 0.0 99.1 96.9 74.9 21.9 0.3 4.5 16.6 6.4 9.9 80.2
Table F.16. Grey-box CW attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00
GFZ 98.7 61.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.6 95.8 94.3 93.8 93.2 11.7 10.2 10.9 9.9 8.5
GBZ 96.3 69.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 95.9 95.7 94.7 94.7 94.5 13.5 12.7 12.3 13.7 14.4
GFY 98.4 54.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.1 96.1 95.3 95.1 94.3 0.0 2.2 3.7 4.6 7.6
GBY 97.6 52.9 2.2 0.0 0.0 97.7 95.6 94.5 94.3 93.7 25.8 15.7 14.2 13.7 18.0
DFX 64.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.5 97.2 97.1 96.7 95.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 91.3 56.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 99.7 99.0 99.0 98.9 98.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 80.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 97.9 97.5 97.3 95.4 0.0 15.7 14.6 8.8 6.1
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Table F.17. Black-box PGD attack results on MNIST.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
GFZ 44.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.3 88.4 62.7 33.8 21.8 48.7 61.0 92.3 99.8 100.0
GBZ 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.8 87.1 70.7 52.9 41.3 51.0 68.6 97.7 100.0 100.0
GFY 49.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.4 86.5 58.1 31.9 21.0 52.5 70.8 97.4 99.8 100.0
GBY 21.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.9 89.3 70.0 49.7 37.8 51.2 70.8 98.2 100.0 100.0
DFX 49.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 91.4 52.1 13.9 2.2 0.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 43.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 95.0 67.0 26.2 9.7 6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 53.8 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.9 56.3 15.2 3.4 1.5 34.7 52.8 94.0 99.9 100.0
Table F.18. Black-box MIM attack results on MNIST.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
GFZ 45.5 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.2 86.6 50.3 17.0 17.0 51.1 68.0 97.5 99.5 99.5
GBZ 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.7 85.9 63.5 35.2 17.1 51.2 74.4 99.0 100.0 100.0
GFY 53.1 2.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 97.2 83.7 49.2 20.1 20.1 55.1 80.6 99.0 99.9 99.9
GBY 24.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.8 88.3 62.8 31.7 13.3 49.3 77.6 99.9 100.0 100.0
DFX 51.3 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 91.4 51.7 13.3 1.9 1.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 47.8 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 94.8 67.0 23.2 7.6 7.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 56.1 2.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 92.7 56.0 13.1 2.8 2.8 35.2 59.9 97.6 100.0 100.0
Table F.19. Black-box CW attack results on MNIST.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00
GFZ 65.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.8 98.7 97.4 94.3 92.0 52.3 50.8 39.6 44.7 55.3
GBZ 76.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.3 97.2 95.9 92.7 90.4 45.7 46.1 41.5 40.3 45.7
GFY 88.4 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.0 98.9 98.0 94.8 92.0 60.0 59.2 51.9 47.6 57.2
GBY 76.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.7 98.6 97.3 95.1 93.5 53.4 52.2 41.8 39.7 46.7
DFX 82.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.8 96.8 92.4 86.2 84.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 82.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.9 98.4 95.5 85.2 83.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 86.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.8 94.5 89.3 81.5 79.3 42.9 25.5 22.3 27.7 38.2
Table F.20. Black-box PGD attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
GFZ 95.5 89.9 45.5 6.8 0.1 97.6 95.6 88.7 68.8 29.7 6.2 6.7 6.0 10.8 71.8
GBZ 92.0 84.1 33.8 3.5 0.0 95.6 94.9 92.7 85.0 65.9 16.7 14.6 12.8 17.9 76.8
GFY 95.3 89.1 38.7 2.5 0.0 97.3 96.6 90.0 72.9 35.5 0.0 2.3 6.8 10.4 72.3
GBY 91.8 80.5 29.7 6.1 0.2 97.2 95.9 90.2 70.8 30.3 21.8 16.4 9.6 13.6 77.3
DFX 89.1 74.5 19.1 0.9 0.0 99.7 98.7 92.6 64.8 9.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 85.5 76.4 42.5 4.5 0.0 99.6 99.0 94.8 77.5 24.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 85.5 73.5 21.1 1.5 0.0 99.5 99.2 93.8 70.1 15.1 0.0 5.0 8.9 15.9 85.1
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Table F.21. Black-box MIM attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
GFZ 95.5 89.7 46.4 7.7 0.2 97.5 95.7 88.5 66.5 20.5 6.2 6.7 5.9 12.7 82.7
GBZ 91.8 84.0 33.1 3.4 0.0 95.6 94.9 92.3 85.1 60.7 16.7 15.5 14.2 21.6 97.9
GFY 95.3 88.9 40.5 3.1 0.0 97.3 96.7 89.5 70.6 31.9 0.0 2.4 7.6 12.5 88.0
GBY 91.7 80.2 29.5 5.9 0.1 97.3 95.9 89.6 69.0 26.1 22.2 16.1 9.7 14.0 95.9
DFX 89.0 74.5 19.4 0.9 0.0 99.6 98.7 92.1 63.0 10.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 85.5 76.3 42.7 4.5 0.0 99.6 99.0 95.1 76.5 27.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 85.3 73.4 21.4 1.6 0.0 99.6 99.1 92.9 67.7 14.9 0.0 4.5 7.5 14.2 91.9
Table F.22. Black-box CW attack results on CIFAR plane-vs-frog binary classification.
substitute acc victim acc TP logit
 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 1000.00
GFZ 96.3 41.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 98.7 94.7 93.4 93.3 92.3 13.3 8.6 7.7 7.7 8.9
GBZ 94.9 73.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 95.9 95.3 94.6 94.5 94.5 13.5 11.8 11.8 13.2 13.1
GFY 96.4 62.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 98.1 96.7 94.8 94.7 94.1 0.0 2.8 6.5 6.1 6.8
GBY 93.5 33.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 97.7 95.9 95.4 95.4 95.0 25.8 16.4 15.9 18.6 19.8
DFX 90.3 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 98.8 98.5 98.5 97.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DBX 87.2 31.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 97.1 94.5 93.9 94.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DFZ 84.9 22.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 99.0 98.3 98.3 97.8 0.0 3.8 2.3 2.3 11.0
Table F.23. FGSM white-box attack results on CIFAR-10.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
VGG16 44.5 25.8 16.6 11.9 10.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 95.1 95.7 97.0 97.5 97.1
GBZ-FC1 63.7 49.7 34.3 18.9 12.7 60.0 62.4 80.6 90.9 94.1 63.7 65.0 80.6 95.0 98.4 90.1 90.8 92.3 92.6 92.6
GBY-FC1 64.9 50.0 36.1 19.5 11.3 52.2 59.0 80.4 90.1 92.5 54.6 61.9 80.3 95.6 98.4 90.7 91.3 92.1 92.4 90.3
DBX-FC1 57.3 45.7 31.8 16.3 10.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.8 93.2 94.0 94.3 92.8
GBZ-CONV9 81.6 74.1 58.5 48.9 45.8 13.7 17.0 28.4 76.0 90.2 18.3 20.6 31.7 64.3 71.6 91.7 91.5 91.7 93.3 86.4
GBY-CONV9 75.8 66.0 39.7 22.5 17.5 14.0 18.2 29.4 74.4 88.9 17.7 20.8 25.8 55.2 68.9 89.6 89.9 90.0 89.1 89.2
DBX-CONV9 59.0 45.7 31.8 17.8 11.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.7 94.1 94.9 95.2 93.7
Table F.24. PGD white-box attack results on CIFAR-10.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
VGG16 18.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.9 91.8 67.4 69.9 66.4
GBZ-FC1 37.7 6.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 30.7 22.2 76.0 92.0 94.1 33.5 24.9 77.0 91.7 90.2 90.8 93.7 97.3 98.5 95.9
GBY-FC1 31.2 8.5 2.6 1.5 0.6 32.0 20.3 82.3 95.1 97.6 36.6 29.5 84.1 93.7 90.4 90.3 94.1 97.7 97.3 96.9
DBX-FC1 23.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.9 91.0 5.6 7.4 5.9
GBZ-CONV9 61.1 38.3 24.2 10.2 2.3 19.2 60.3 96.7 98.9 99.6 20.1 60.3 96.8 98.3 98.7 90.3 93.1 97.7 98.7 99.6
GBY-CONV9 66.5 26.6 3.2 0.4 0.0 17.0 55.6 95.7 99.2 99.6 17.8 52.7 95.3 98.6 97.6 89.6 91.8 98.7 99.4 96.9
DBX-CONV9 24.0 3.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.3 93.1 99.3 99.6 99.2
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Table F.25. MIM white-box attack results on CIFAR-10.
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20
VGG16 13.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.2 92.4 72.3 77.1 79.0
GBZ-FC1 24.5 2.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 34.8 40.9 88.5 95.8 96.0 38.8 44.0 90.4 96.4 96.6 91.3 95.0 95.7 97.9 96.8
GBY-FC1 33.0 19.6 11.8 7.2 4.9 29.1 38.7 95.7 99.1 99.3 38.4 49.2 96.3 99.3 99.4 90.7 95.0 97.8 97.9 97.9
DBX-FC1 17.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.1 89.6 9.6 14.5 16.0
GBZ-CONV9 57.6 43.5 29.1 24.1 22.6 27.4 78.5 99.4 99.6 99.7 29.1 78.3 99.6 99.7 99.8 90.2 94.4 97.5 98.0 98.2
GBY-CONV9 39.1 18.1 4.3 1.9 1.5 25.6 70.4 98.6 99.6 99.8 28.2 71.1 98.6 99.7 99.8 89.6 94.5 99.4 99.8 99.7
DBX-CONV9 19.2 3.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.1 96.7 99.9 100.0 100.0
Table F.26. FGSM white-box attack results on MNIST (with varied bottleneck layer sizes).
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
DBX-16 92.6 85.6 76.4 64.7 52.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 90.3 92.4 92.3 92.7 94.2
DBX-32 92.6 84.4 71.1 57.2 46.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.2 92.3 92.8 94.9 95.0
DBX-64 91.6 77.8 58.1 44.5 36.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.6 93.6 95.2 96.3 97.0
DBX-128 87.8 47.6 20.1 12.7 10.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 94.4 97.6 97.8 97.1 96.4
GBZ-16 92.0 75.8 52.5 34.0 21.7 28.7 71.5 99.9 100.0 100.0 49.2 86.3 99.9 100.0 100.0 90.8 90.6 92.0 91.9 90.9
GBZ-32 91.1 74.4 52.4 33.4 21.6 26.5 73.5 99.7 100.0 100.0 49.4 87.2 99.9 100.0 100.0 91.0 90.6 91.8 91.4 91.6
GBZ-64 92.5 80.3 62.0 42.4 27.2 37.0 81.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 57.6 93.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.6 90.9 90.3 91.1 91.5
GBZ-128 90.8 76.8 57.5 38.9 24.8 26.6 63.0 99.6 100.0 100.0 44.9 78.7 99.8 100.0 100.0 87.9 90.1 90.7 91.1 90.6
GBY-16 94.2 77.7 49.4 23.9 12.1 41.9 84.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 52.9 91.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.6 92.0 93.0 93.1 92.6
GBY-32 94.5 76.9 45.4 20.0 9.6 41.4 83.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 56.3 92.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.0 91.6 93.3 93.2 93.0
GBY-64 93.6 76.4 47.5 22.3 10.7 41.9 84.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 57.7 92.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.3 92.7 92.8 92.9 92.9
GBY-128 93.0 72.9 42.2 18.5 9.0 37.4 71.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 50.1 81.9 99.9 100.0 100.0 90.7 91.4 91.8 91.4 92.0
Table F.27. PGD white-box attack results on MNIST (with varied bottleneck layer sizes).
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
DBX-16 69.8 36.6 16.0 5.9 1.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.2 91.9 92.8 93.3 93.7
DBX-32 63.5 26.8 12.5 6.2 2.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.5 92.1 92.7 92.9 93.5
DBX-64 58.0 18.3 6.0 1.3 0.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 92.7 94.0 94.1 93.7 84.8
DBX-128 42.3 3.0 1.1 0.3 0.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 97.1 97.1 98.4 98.4 98.6
GBZ-16 88.3 62.8 37.4 23.1 15.5 27.1 35.8 71.9 98.9 100.0 46.3 53.0 82.3 99.3 100.0 89.6 91.7 92.3 91.4 91.8
GBZ-32 87.1 61.9 40.2 28.0 20.4 24.0 39.1 76.7 98.9 100.0 41.5 56.4 85.4 99.7 100.0 91.3 91.0 91.1 91.3 91.1
GBZ-64 85.1 57.4 32.5 19.3 11.6 33.7 50.3 84.4 99.7 100.0 52.2 66.3 91.5 99.8 100.0 90.0 91.5 91.5 91.7 91.8
GBZ-128 84.4 57.5 36.8 25.2 16.8 25.4 35.4 66.1 96.6 100.0 41.5 50.5 76.4 97.7 100.0 88.6 90.4 90.4 90.0 90.6
GBY-16 90.4 49.7 15.0 4.2 1.6 42.6 64.7 89.9 99.3 100.0 51.1 70.8 92.8 99.5 100.0 91.9 93.1 91.9 90.7 91.0
GBY-32 88.4 39.8 9.5 1.8 0.6 45.6 74.3 92.8 99.5 100.0 56.8 78.2 94.8 99.8 100.0 90.8 92.2 91.7 91.0 90.6
GBY-64 86.7 35.9 9.0 1.7 0.4 45.3 76.1 94.6 99.7 100.0 56.9 79.3 95.6 99.9 100.0 90.1 92.1 91.6 91.7 91.4
GBY-128 83.3 35.1 8.7 2.3 0.8 39.1 63.9 86.7 98.3 100.0 51.7 69.1 89.2 98.9 100.0 89.8 90.7 90.4 89.7 89.5
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Table F.28. MIM white-box attack results on MNIST (with varied bottleneck layer sizes).
acc. (adv) TP marginal TP logit TP KL
 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
DBX-16 72.2 37.1 20.7 14.7 11.7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.8 92.3 92.8 93.4 93.9
DBX-32 66.7 27.6 16.8 12.5 10.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 91.8 92.5 92.4 93.2 93.5
DBX-64 66.7 28.7 19.7 17.2 17.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 93.5 94.3 94.6 94.7 94.7
DBX-128 42.3 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 97.2 97.6 98.6 98.9 99.1
GBZ-16 83.8 36.4 8.9 2.3 0.9 26.9 79.8 99.7 100.0 100.0 43.3 88.0 99.8 100.0 100.0 91.6 92.1 91.2 91.6 92.6
GBZ-32 82.7 35.5 9.5 3.0 1.1 26.6 83.2 99.7 100.0 100.0 45.8 90.0 99.8 100.0 100.0 90.3 91.7 91.4 92.5 92.6
GBZ-64 79.6 27.4 5.6 1.5 0.5 36.1 86.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 53.5 93.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 91.3 91.4 91.9 92.2 92.7
GBZ-128 79.2 32.1 8.7 2.6 1.2 26.1 68.5 99.2 100.0 100.0 41.2 79.1 99.4 100.0 100.0 89.7 91.5 91.4 91.4 92.5
GBY-16 89.2 34.6 3.5 0.2 0.0 44.8 88.1 99.8 100.0 100.0 55.9 91.7 99.7 100.0 100.0 89.4 92.5 91.0 90.6 36.9
GBY-32 86.7 25.8 1.6 0.1 0.0 45.1 91.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 58.6 94.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 90.9 91.8 91.1 68.6 31.1
GBY-64 84.9 22.9 1.5 0.1 0.0 47.4 91.2 99.9 100.0 100.0 59.8 92.8 99.9 100.0 100.0 91.4 92.1 91.2 86.8 29.0
GBY-128 82.1 23.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 40.4 83.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 51.7 87.5 99.6 100.0 100.0 91.2 91.2 89.8 82.8 44.4
